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Review of Selective Service Reclassifications

ROBERT M. O'NEIL*

In the fall of 1965 a group of University of Michigan students staged a
sit-in at the Ann Arbor draft board to protest the Vietnam War.
When the Selective Service director in New York City heard about the
affair, he urged local draft boards within his area to cancel student
deferments of any of the participants who were registered there. Two
Michigan undergraduates, one from Manhattan and the other from
Queens, soon were notified that they had been reclassified I-A and
were "delinquent" because the sit-in violated the Selective Service
Act.' The students promptly brought suit against the regional Selective Service director, seeking a restoration of their deferments, but
the district court dismissed the suit for want of a justiciable controversy. The court of appeals reversed in Wolff v. Selective Service
Local Board No. 16,2 finding that the draft boards had exceeded their
jurisdiction; while the students could have been indicted for their protest activities in Michigan, nothing in the Selective Service Act empowered draft boards to withdraw deferments as punishment for such
violations.
In order to reach the merits of the case, however, the court faced a
formidable barrier that had deterred the district judge at the threshold. The Government argued that no reclassification, however questionable, could be reviewed prior to a registrant's appearance for induction into the service. To meet this argument the court of appeals
fashioned important new law. Not every withdrawal of a deferment,
* Professor of Law and Executive Assistant to the President, State University of New York at Buffalo. A.B., A.M., LL.B., Harvard University.
1. 50 U.S.C. App. § 451 et seq. (1964), as amended, (Supp. HI, 1965-67).
2. 372 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1967).
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the court acknowledged, would warrant judicial intervention at this
stage. Where reclassification merely causes the registrant worry and
inconvenience, he must bide his time and take his chances; no justiciable controversy will arise until an induction order has been received and he has responded to it. In Wolff, however, "[t]he effect
of the reclassification itself is immediately to curtail the exercise of

First Amendment rights

.

.

.

.

3

Moreover, this threat to constitu-

tionally protected interests was magnified by
the uncertainty as to the standard which the Service has applied. As
there is no statute or regulation to guide the local boards, the registrant
cannot know whether sit-ins alone will be deemed a basis for reclassification or whether sidewalk demonstrations or even more remote con4
duct are to be included.
Under these special circumstances, then, the reclassification by itself
created a justiciable controversy.
The court of appeals then went one step further. Not only should
the district court entertain the suit under such conditions, but the
plaintiffs also were not barred by their neglect of the channels of
appeal available within the Selective Service System.5 Exhaustion of
these remedies was held unnecessary, partly because of the overriding
first amendment interest that demanded early vindication and partly
because the national appeal board and the national Selective Service
director had already rejected almost identical claims for the reinstatement of deferments in other cases. 6
By the fall of 1967, just as Wolff was being widely cited as the basis
for other suits to enjoin reclassifications, two developments significantly undercut its impact. First, Congress amended the statute so as
to deprive district courts of the power asserted in Wolff; section 10(b)
(3) of the new law provided that "no judicial review shall be made of
the classification or processing of any registrant by local boards . . .
except as a defense to a criminal prosecution . . . after the registrant
has responded either affirmatively or negatively to an order to repcrL

for induction

.

.

.

.
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Second, Selective Service Director Lewis B.

Hershey sent to all local boards a directive recommending prompt
reclassification of registrants who took part in anti-draft protests ad
other violations of the Selective Service law.8 Such activities, he
3. Id. at 823.
4. Id. at 824.
5. For description of the appeal procedure, see Comment, The Selective

Service, 76 YALE L.J. 160, 170-72 (1966).

6. In fact, by the time the Wolff case had reached the court of appeals, the
national appeal board had unanimously ruled against claims for restoration of
deferments by other students who had been reclassified following the Ann
Arbor draft board sit-in. Wolff v. Selective Service Local Bd. No. iRS,312
F.2d 817, 825 (2d Cir. 1967).

7. 50 U.S.C. APP. § 460(b) (3) (Supp. III, 1965-67), amending 50 U.S.C.

APP. § 460(b) (3)

(1964).

8. Letter from Lt. Gen. Lewis B. Hershey to All Members of the Selective

later explained, would include not only destruction of draft cards or
draft board sit-ins, but demonstrations against military recruiters on
college campuses as well. He argued that such demonstrations violated the law "by inference" if not directly, since they made it more
difficult for other registrants to volunteer for military serviceY
The net effect of these two developments was to accelerate the
punitive use of reclassification and, at the same time, to insulate such
action by draft boards until induction notices were received. The
result was predictable. Some reclassification suits filed after Wolff
were awaiting decision in the district courts; here, clearly, the validity
of the new section 10 (b) (3) would be tested. Other suits were gencrated by local implementations of General Hershey's directive.
Within a few weeks, injunctions were sought on behalf of two clergymen reclassified from IV-D to I-A because they turned in their draft
cards; a twenty-nine year old professor with three children who lost
his 1I-A deferment for the same reason; and a University of Oklahoma student whose deferment was withdrawn because his draft
board did not feel his "activity as a member of Students for a Democratic Society [was] to the best interests of the U.S. Government."'"
Moreover, before the end of the year the National Student Association
-on behalf of several other student organizations and individual
registrants-filed a suit attacking the constitutionality of General
Hershey's memo and the practice of withdrawing deferments as
punishment for protest activity. 1
Soon after the effective date of the new Selective Service amendments, the courts were filled with such cases. In each case the threshold question of jurisdiction had to be faced-a question involving
both the construction and the constitutionality of the new judicial
review section. The first courts to rule on the matter held that Congress had meant to foreclose any review of a classification prior to the
induction stage and had the constitutional power to postpone that
appeal. 12 A district judge in Georgia conceded this conclusion left the
Service System, Oct. 26, 1967, & Local Board Memorandum No. 85, Oct. 24,
1967, in N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1967, at 2, cols. 3-5.
9. N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1967, at 2, cols. 3-5.
10. The cases are summarized in Academe (Newsletter of the American
Association of University Professors), Jan. 1968, at 4. There were other cases
worthy of note during that period. A Protestant chaplain at Cornell Univer-

sity, for example, was reclassified I-A after turning in his draft card to pro-

lest the war. N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1968, at 41, cols. 1-5. A 37-year-old
history professor at the University of Maryland was, for similar acts of protest,

ordered by his draft board to do janitorial work in lieu of military service.

N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1968, at 12, col. 3. The National Selective Service administration promptly reversed that order, however. N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1968,

at 11, col. 1. Meanwhile, several other suits were brought to challenge the

Hershey directive and to seek restoration of deferments and exemptions withdrawn for protest activities. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1968, at 3, cols. 3-4.

For further information about the Oklahoma student reclassified because of
draft board hostility to his SDS leadership, see N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1968, at
11, col. 1.

11. National Student Ass'n v. Hershey, Civil No. 3078-67 (D.D.C. Mar. 8,

1968), summarized in 1 SSLR 3026 (1968), and Brief for Respondents at 81-82,
Oestereich v. Selective Service Local Bd. No. 11, No. 46 (U.S. 1968).
12. E.g., Moskowitz v. Kindt, 273 F. Supp. 646 (E.D. Pa. 1967), aff'd, 394
F.2d 648 (3d Cir. 1968); Zigmond v. Selective Service Local Bd. No. 16, 284
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registrant a "Hobson's choice," but insisted that was the quandary
Congress had meant to place him in.13 The district courts were not in
complete accord, however. One case was decided in the registrant's
favor, despite the new statute, because a district judge in New York
14
saw "irreparable harm if his immediate induction is not enjoined."'
Meanwhile, a district court in San Francisco could find no escape
from the preclusive effect of the new provision, but held it to be a
denial of due process. 15 The court deemed it "unconstitutional to
restrict a registrant to the criminal trial forum to raise the defense
that his order to report for induction was invalid because of procedural
errors committed by the agency in the classification process."' 8 Under this view, not even the special first amendment interests present
in Wolff apparently need be shown in order 7 to reverse a reclassifiation; "procedural errors" alone would suffice.'
One other case should be mentioned, because it is the vehicle by
which the question has reached the Supreme Court. A divinity
school student named Oestereich-who was entitled to and held the
same IV-D classification that ministers enjoy' 8 --turned his draft card
in to the Department of Justice in October 1967.19 Two weeks later
his Wyoming draft board sent him a I-A delinquency notice for failure
to have a registration certificate in his possession. The student
appealed unsuccessfully through the Selective Service System and
then filed suit in the district court seeking reinstatement of his exempt
status. The district court dismissed the action, and the court of
appeals affirmed,20 both courts relying on the judicial review provision of the new law.
The student's petition for certiorari brought a curiously ambivalent
response from the Solicitor General. The Government's memorandum
to the Court suggested that special circumstances might warrant juF. Supp. 732 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 396 F.2d 290 (1st Cir. 1968); Breen v. Selective
Service Local Bd. No. 16, 284 F. Supp. 749 (D. Conn. 1968).
13. Carpenter v. Hendrix, 277 F. Supp. 660, 662 (N.D. Ga. 1967).
14. Kimball v. Selective Service Local Bd. No. 15, 283 F. Supp. 606, 608
(S.D.N.Y. 1968). The court stressed the fact that this suit was a class action,
which may have contributed materially to the perception of injury that would
result unless an injunction issued.
15. Petersen v. Clark, 285 F. Supp. 700 (N.D. Cal. 1968). See also Faulkner
v. Clifford, 289 F. Supp. 895 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
16. 285 F. Supp. at 712.
17. Because of its broad approach to the constitutional issue, the court had
little occasion to consider the plaintiff's particular objections to his reclassification. It did not appear, however,, that there was any substantive (e.g.,
first amendment) issue at stake approaching the gravity of those involved in
most of the other cases, where the courts uniformly refused to enjoin reclassification under the amended statute.
18. See 50 U.S.C. APP. § 456 (g) (1964).
19. Oestereich v. Selective Service Local Bd. No. 11, 280 F. Supp. 78 (D.
Wyo.), aff'd per curiam, 390 F.2d 100 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, 88 S. Ct. 1804
(1968) (No. 1246, 1967 Term; renumbered No. 46, 1968 Term).
20. 390 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1968).

dicial intervention in this case because the exemption for ministers
and divinity students was grounded in the clear terms of the statute.
But the Solicitor General also urged the Court to hold the judicial review provision constitutional as applied to the general run of reclassification cases. The Supreme Court agreed to review the case.

The Meaning of the Statute
Enough has been said to frame the two questions that must now be
answered: First, how far has Congress in fact gone in limiting the
power of district courts to review reclassifications before induction?
Second, what constitutional issues does the statute raise if it is broadly
construed? The first question requires more than passing attention,
because the 1967 amendment is less precise than a superficial reading
of its words might suggest. Accordingly, we begin the inquiry with an
attempt to divine its meaning.
Some understanding of the background of judicial review of reclassifications is essential. There has been a recurrent'tension between the registrant's quest for a court test of a classification he feels
erroneous or unjust and the interest of the Selective Service System
in avoiding litigation that may impede or complicate the recruiting of
needed manpower. The tension has been resolved by an uncertain
accommodation. The first of the World War II cases, Falbo v. United
States,2 assumed that a registrant must have some chance to question his classification, but the Court found neither statutory nor constitutional basis for review prior to appearance for induction (or in
the case of a conscientious objector such as Falbo himself, presentation
for assignment to civilian work in lieu of service).. Thus Falbo's
attempt to review- the classification in a. prosecution for failure to
report for assignment to civilian work was premature. Over the
dissent of fr. Justice Murphy, the Court deferred to a, congressional
judgment that the exigencies of war required a degree of speed that
would not allow registrants to challenge their classificationsbefore the
final stage of acceptance or induction.
Two years later the apparent harshness of Falbo was tempered
somewhat by Estep v. United States, 22 decided after the end of hostilities. The governing statute made decisions of local draft boards
"final.' 23 However, the Court found in this term no design to foreclose all judicial review of classifications, but simply to narrow the
scope of review. Only when there was "no basis in fact" for the
board's action could a court set it aside; 24 merely erroneous decisions
21. 320 U.S. 549 (1944).
22. 327 U.S. 114 (1946).
23. Act of Sept. 16, 1940, ch. 720, § 10(a) (2), 54 Stat. 885.

24. The Court thus gave deference to the congressional use of the term
"final" by narrowing the scope of review:
The provision making the decisions of the local boards "final" means to
us that Congress chose not to give administrative action under this
Act the customary scope of judicial review which obtains under other
statutes. It means that the courts are not to weigh the evidence to determine whether the classification made by the local boards was justified.
MAA(
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or orders contrary to the weight of the evidence, which might be
reversible under general principles governing review of agency action,
were immune in the Selective Service context. This recognition of
the availability of limited judicial review, albeit at the late stage to
which it was relegated by Falbo, mooted the difficult constitutional
issue that would have emerged if the Court had defined the statutory
term "final" as "unreviewable at any time."
Neither of these cases, to be sure, involved the question that is now
before us-whether a court may order a draft board to restore a
deferment or exemption it has taken away or may enjoin a threatened
induction. That issue was soon to arise in pure form. At least four
federal courts did consider the question of jurisdiction of suits against
draft boards between Estep and Wolff. The Courts of Appeals for the
Sixth and Tenth Circuits divided on the question,25 though neither
considered the issue at any length. In addition, two district courts
assumed they had the power to stay draft board proceedings prior to
induction if a sufficient case were made on the merits to upset the
classification. 2 But only once during these two decades did the question receive serious consideration in the courts. Judge Jerome Frank,
dissenting from the Second Circuit's refusal to reach the merits of a
registrant's suit to enjoin his induction, 27 cautioned against complete judicial abdication. If the local board's action demonstrated a
complete lack of jurisdiction-if, for example, the plaintiff were "a
member of Congress or . . . a naval officer on active duty"-Judge
Frank "gravely doubted" that such a registrant must wait to challenge the validity of a classification until he was called for induction.
It is understandable that this question has until recently had rather
limited practical importance. The rapid rise in anti-Vietnam War
sentiment, particularly among those age groups most vulnerable to
The decisions of the local boards made in conformity with the regulations
are final even though they may be erroneous. The question of jurisdiction of the local board is reached only if there is no basis in fact for the
classification which it gave the registrant.
327 U.S. at 122-23.
25. Compare Townsend v. Zimmerman, 237 F.2d 376 (6th Cir. 1956) (Stewart, J.) with Warren v. Abernathy, 198 F.2d 622 (10th Cir. 1952). The court
of appeals in Townsend simply assumed that the registrant was entitled to
have his induction enjoined while he was pursuing an administrative appeal
-a factor which may make this case somewhat more appealing for the plaintiff than the ordinary suit of this type.
26. Ex parte Fabiani, 105 F. Supp. 139 (E.D. Pa. 1952); Tomlinson v. Hershey, 95 F. Supp. 72 (E.D. Pa. 1949). (The two cases were decided by different judges of the same court.) Fabianiwas a most unusual case. The registrant received an induction notice while studying at a medical school abroad,
followed shortly by a letter from the United States Attorney threatening indictment if the registrant did not return promptly. He then filed a petition
for habeas corpus, which was granted-even though he had not yet been inducted-on the ground that the petitioner was already in "constructive custody of the Government" after the threat of indictment. 105 F. Supp. at 148.
27. Schwartz v. Strauss, 206 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1953) (concurring opinion).

the draft, together with the new Selective Service policy of regulating
demonstration and protest through reclassification, have spurred the
quest for avenues of challenge outside the Selective Service System.
The sharp rise in convictions for refusing induction-a 76 per cent
increase from 1966 to 1967-reflects this tension between registrant
and Selective Service. 28 Moreover, the favorable decision in Wolff
undoubtedly encouraged the filing of injunction suits. Thus a convergence of pressures has given this jurisdictional question a practical
significance not possible during the quiet years between the end of
World War II and the Vietnam escalation.
The relative novelty of Wolff suggests that Congress dealt with
the question of judicial review more out of anxiety about the future
than dissatisfaction with the past. There was no reference in the
legislative history to the extent of pending or anticipated litigation
against Selective Service decisions, and there was apparently little
awareness of the development of the issue since Falbo. Moreover,
there were important differences of tone, if not of substance, between
the House and Senate committee reports, neither of which devoted
more than one or two paragraphs to the matter. The Senate committee report contained an obvious reference to Wolff:
Until recently, there was no problem in the observance of the finality provision. In several recent cases, however, district courts have
been brought into selective service processing prematurely. The committee attaches much importance to the finality provisions and reemphasizes the original intent that judicial review of classifications should
not occur until after the registrant's administrative remedies
have been
exhausted and the registrant presents himself for induction.29
In the view of the House committee, the language in the new bill
reenunciated the principle already in existing law that the courts
cannot review the classification action of the Selective Service System
until after a registrant has been ordered to report for induction and
has responded either affirmatively or negatively.
The Committee was disturbed by the apparent inclination of some
courts to review the classification action of local or appeal boards
before the registrant had exhausted his administrative remedies. Existing law quite clearly precludes such a judicial review until after the
registrant has been ordered to report for induction and has responded
either affirmatively or negatively to such an order.,3 0
The inconclusive character of these statements invites diverse interpretations of congressional intent. It seems appropriate to canvass
the possibilities before reaching the constitutional question, for the
constitutional issue is presented only if the statute postpones all judicial review to the induction stage. Although one district judge has
found an implied exception to section 10 (b) (3) which would forestall
the constitutional issue,-3 most courts have found the constitutional
Judge Frank eventually concurred with the court's dismissal of the suit, because he found no basis for intervention after reaching the merits.
28. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1968, at 76, cols. 3-6.
29. S. REP. No. 209, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1967).
30. H.R. REP. No. 267, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 30-31 (1967).
31. Kimball v. Selective Service Local Bd. No. 15, 283 F. Supp. 606 (S.D.
N.Y. 1968).
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question unavoidably posed by the statute's comprehensive language.
(1) One possible reading must be mentioned for the sake of symmetry. but can be readily dismissed. The language of the statute by
itself might be deemed to affect the scope rather than the timing of
judicial review-that is. to change the "no basis in fact" test formulated in Estep and refined in later cases.3 2 There was, however,
no mention of the question of scope of review anywhere in the legislative history, and no recent cases have dealt with the issue in a way
that might have aroused congressional concern. Although the prior
statutes said nothing about the scope of review, it seems quite clear
that the 1967 amendment, by incorporating the "no basis in fact"
language from the earlier cases, meant to codify the line of decisions
reaching back to Estep. The one district court to consider the issue
since enactment of the new law has so held: "The language of the
statute and its legislative history point to the conclusion that Congress left untouched the power of the courts to consider-in a criminal prosecution-jurisdictional errors other than those dealing with
33
the classification.9
(2) Perhaps Congress intended only to require exhaustion of those
administrative remedies afforded within the Selective Service System
before resorting to the courts. If the only purpose was to overrule
Wolff, that is a quite plausible reading, for the plaintiffs in that case
filed their suit before they had appealed through Selective Service
channels. Moreover, some of the testimony before the congressional
committees stressed the importance of requiring exhaustion in accordance with well settled principles of administrative law, 34 and both
committee reports cited exhaustion of remedies as one concern of the
amendment. The virtue of this approach, of course, is avoidance of
the constitutional issue by permitting pre-induction review as broad
as the review previously available in a prosecution for refusing induction.
This construction must, however, be dismissed as an idle hope. The
congressional committees did speak of exhaustion, but those references were always followed-in the reports as well as in the statutewith an insistence that review must also await the registrant's affirmative or negative response to an order to report for induction.
To read the amendment as requiring only exhaustion would give
back what Fal~o took away. Such a construction is hardly consistent
with the temper of the Congress that adopted the provision or of the
Selective Service administration that called for it. Finally, this view
32. E.g.. Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375 (1955); Dickinson v. United

States. 346 U.S. 389 (1954,.
33. United S:ates v. Lybrand, 279 F. Supp. 74, 77 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
34. See, e.g., JAFFE. JLDICLAL CO.NTROL OF ADMIuiN'ISTPiTVE AcTIoN, 424-50
(1965)

[hereinafter cited as

JAFFE].

would attribute to the administrative appeal an unrealistic importance; requiring exhaustion, by itself, is of little value to the Selective
Service if the courts can intervene as soon an an appeal has been
denied (or has been foreclosed by unanimity at the intermediate level).
This construction must, therefore, be rejected despite its obvious
attraction. Timing, not exhaustion, is the heart of the matter.
(3) A close reading of the language of the amendment suggests
another construction. There can be judicial review only after "the
registrant has responded either affirmatively or negatively to an order
to report for induction or for civilian work . . . ." Heretofore, under
Falbo it has been assumed-save for the few injunction suits discussed
above 35 -that the registrant actually had to appear at the induction
center and refuse to take the critical "step forward"; only this refusal
would set in motion a prosecution in which the validity of the classification could be challenged. Accordingly, it has been suggested that
the amendment does alter the exhaustion requirement to this extent
by "no longer requiring that a registrant report" for induction; that is,
he may now reopen his classification in a prosecution for failing to
appear.36 The frequency with which registrants will be rejected at
the induction center as a result of physical inspection or other reasons is persuasive evidence to the contrary, however. 37 Given the
possibility of such rejection and the recent amendment's mandate that
the registrant exhaust all his administrative remedies, this construction seems incompatible with the congressional design.
(4) Professor John Griffiths has proposed another construction of
the amendment which seems more consonant with its origins. The
sta'ute, he notes, forecloses pre-induction review only of "classification or processing." "Surely it is plausible," he suggests, "to argue
that an act wholly outside a board's jurisdiction cannot be described
as an act of 'classification or processing' since these terms refer to the
ordinary, authorized activities of draft boards. '38 There is some basis
for this interpretation in the way the courts have handled review of
NLRB certification orders, despite an apparent statutory preclusion.
In this and other contexts, exceptions to a mandate against review
have been found when the claim for review rests on an allegation
that the agency has exceeded its jurisdiction. 39 The same reasoning
might be applied here.
The argument to the contrary is forceful, however. Both the history and the language of the recent amendment suggest a much more
restrictive congressional view than is apparent in the labor-certification context.40 Furthermore, the interest in dispatch and certainty
35. See cases cited at notes 25-26 supra.
36. See Griffiths, Book Review, 77 YALE L.J. 827, 829-30 n.15 (1968).
37. The contrary argument is forcefully developed in Sable, The Meaning

of the 1967 Amendment of Section 10(b)(3) of the Selective Service Act
22-24 (unpublished manuscript 1968).
38. Griffiths, Some Notes on the Solicitor General's Memorandum in Oestereich: Concerning Punitive Reclassifications and § 10(b)(3) of the Act, 1

SILR 4012, 4013 (1968).
39. E.g. Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958).
note 34, at 339-53.

See generally, JAFFE, supra
40. In the labor-certification context, as in most others where an excep-
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appears somewhat stronger here. And, finally, there is an important
difference between the equitable interests of the two plaintiffs: In
the labor context the party seeking review (for example, a union that
lost an election) may be unable to challenge the administrative decision through any other channel at any time.41 The alternative for
the registrant who wants to reopen his classification is, of course,
onerous and risky; a criminal prosecution carries consequences far
graver than the prospect of losing an injunction suit. Nevertheless,
not all channels are closed to the registrant as they often are in the
other contexts where an exception to "unreviewability" has been
implied by the courts.
(5) A more cautious view of the implied exception is that of the
Solicitor General. In his brief in Oestereich he argued that an injunction suit might be permitted in a case where the action of the
local board contravenes a clear statutory policy-for example, where
a registrant is deprived of an exemption clearly conferred by Congress.42 Since one exception must be read into section 10(b) (3) to
permit review by habeas corpus, 43 the Solicitor General has suggested
that another exception can be tolerated because of the need to resolve
the conflict of statutes.
This exception may reflect sensible policy, but it makes dangerous
law. The exception for habeas corpus has so clear a constitutional
basis that it hardly need be declared in the statute, nor need there be
any legislative history to support it. The exception for injunction
suits under limited conditions must, however, stand on a quite different
footing. If its rationale lies in the apparent conflict between the two
statutes, then one would expect some indication in the legislative
materials that Congress meant to qualify the later statute rather than
the earlier one. An equally plausible reading would hold the policy of
section 10(b) (3) to be so strong that the courts must not interfere
before induction even when the draft board has disobeyed a clear
statutory command. Moreover, the same kind of claim could be made
tion of this sort has been implied, the statute has not expressly foreclosed or
postponed judicial review, but has simply been silent on the question. The
dissenters in Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958), did point to some legislative history that suggested a preclusive intent, but this design never found its
way into the terms of the statute. Thus the cases are really quite different
in this respect.
41. Even this persuasive factor has not always sufficed to make reviewable actions for which review was not provided in the statute. E.g., Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297 (1943).
42. E.g., 50 U.S.C. APP. § 456(g) (1964).
43. As the Solicitor General's brief in Oestereich notes, the absence of provisions for habeas corpus in § 10(b) (3) cannot carry any significance beyond oversight, or assumption that such a reference was superfluous. Habeas
corpus was clearly recognized under the prior law, Witmer v. United States,
348 U.S. 375, 377 (1955), and there is surely no evidence of any design to extinguish preexisting remedies.

in almost every colorable injunction suit against the Selective Service.
If, on the other hand, the basis for this exception is constitutional,
then the argument proves too much. Whatever may be said about the
constitutionality of postponing review (or barring all review) under
these circumstances cannot be confined to the facts of the Oestereich
case. The constitutional arguments marshalled in support of the
exception will apply equally to most cases in which reclassification
has been used to punish dissent or protest. Indeed, at one level, the
constitutional argument reveals misgivings about the validity (on procedural due process grounds) of foreclosing review before induction,
regardless of the substantive basis for the classification. But even in
its narrower reading, the constitutional argument presented by the
Solicitor General is necessarily so broad that it permits the exception
to swallow much of the rule.
(6) At least one court has suggested an exception to the judicial
review amendment in cases of "irreparable harm. '44 The phrase has
a beguiling appeal but the logic of this dispensation is little firmer
than the foundation of the Solicitor General's exception. The "harm"
at issue in that case was no more "irreparable" than a great many cases
where a registrant claims that a reclassification is beyond the local
board's jurisdiction or violates his constitutional rights; if he cannot
raise his claim by civil suit, then he faces a practical choice between
three years in federal prison or a year in Vietnam. The real basis for
the "irreparable harm" exception was, in fact, a passage from the
Solicitor General's original memorandum in Oestereich which suffered
the same limitations as the brief on the merits.
Rejection of this last possibility brings the inquiry full circle. None
of the proposed exceptions (other than the undeniable recognition of
habeas corpus after induction) finds a valid basis in the statute or its
history. Congress clearly meant to do more than require a registrant
to exhaust his remedies within the Selective Service before going to
court; the prior law, with the possible exception of Wolff, requires at
least that much. 45 Whether Congress might have wished to allow
review in a prosecution for refusing to report for induction rather
than refusing induction is a question of merely abstract interest.
Even if there were practical value to it, the legislative context seems
so clearly against even this limited exception that there is little basis
for pressing the claim. One returns at length to the position that
most of the courts have assumed: The statute means what its terms
suggest-that a classification may not be challenged until after the
registrant has reported for induction or for civilian work and has
"responded affirmatively or negatively." If he reponds affirmatively,
he may then file a habeas corpus petition as soon as he is officially
44. Kimball v. Selective Service Local Bd. No. 15, 283 F. Supp. 606, 608
(S.D.N.Y. 1968).
45. It is difficult to read Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549 (1944), as requiring any less-although it is true that several lower federal courts relaxed
the Falbo standard during the years before and after the Korean War.
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serving in the armed forces.

The ConstitutionalDimension
The Issue Defined
The constitutional issue cannot be avoided. In order to frame that
issue, however, a word or two must be said about what is not involved.
Congress has not attempted to cut off all judicial review of Selective
Service action. Were that the case, the answer would be fairly clear:
Habeas corpus, at least, must survive by implication, and very likely
there must be some other opportunity to question a classificationin a prosecution for refusing induction if no earlier occasion is provided.
Despite some superficial similarity, the issue here is not the one that
surrounds a request for a declaratory judgment about one's status.
It is true that the registrant wants a judicial opinion about his situation and the risks he may incur in the future. But unlike the resident alien longshoreman who wants to leave the country temporarily
but fears he may not be allowed to reenter the country; 46 or the postal
employee who wants to participate in political activity forbidden by
the Hatch Act; 47 or the physician who wants to give proscribed birth

control information,48 the registrant who questions the constitutionality of his classification has already done the act or effected the
change of status that places him in jeopardy. The decisions about
what happens to him next, and how soon, are now out of his hands. He
may, of course, still act in such a way as to avoid the next turn of the
wheel on which he is caught-for example, by fleeing the country or
by enlisting voluntarily in the armed forces. The vital difference,
however, is that unless he takes such a step (or the draft call declines
sharply) he may be called for service at any time pursuant to someone else's decision. Thus the discussion of the problem as one of
"ripeness" may be misleading. Although the timing of review is, of
course, the central issue here, there is not an issue of "ripeness" in the
usual sense; the "ripening" of the plaintiff's claim does not depend,
as in the typical case where "unripeness" impedes review, upon his
own failure to take some necessary further step.
Nor, despite a beguiling symmetry, is the question of timing the
same as the question considered in Yakus v. United States. 49 In that
case the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of the judicial
review provisions of the World War II Emergency Price Control Act.
46. International Longshoremen's Union v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222 (1954).
47. United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
48. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
49. 321 U.S. 414 (1944).

Under those provisions, objections to OPA price regulations could be
raised through administrative hearings, with review in the Emergency
Court of Appeals within sixty days after promulgation. Additional
objections could be raised subsequently if they were based on grounds
arising after expiration of the sixty days. A person or firm charged
with violation of a regulation was, however, precluded from challenging its validity in a criminal prosecution. Relying in part upon the
exercise of the special powers that a national emergency vests in Congress, the Court found no denial of due process in this unusual
acceleration of judicial review. But that case is not this one, nor does
it control here. If the registrant were given full administrative and
judicial review of a classification before induction, the foreclosure of
review in a subsequent prosecution for refusing induction might impose a difficult choice, but one far less onerous than that imposed by
the reverse relationship that now obtains in the draft context. Yakus
is therefore of little help in understanding or deciding the question
now before us, even though there is a common concern with the timing
of judicial review.
So much for what is not involved here. It is more difficult to
identify what is at stake. There is no simple formula by which to
determine when an avenue of judicial review should be implied to
avoid a constitutional collision, or created because of one. The Supreme Court has said that "if the absence of jurisdiction of the federal
courts meant a sacrifice or obliteration of a right which Congress has
created, the inference would be strong that Congress intended the
statutory provisions governing the general jurisdiction of those courts
to control." 50 Moreover, even where Congress has expressly declined
to provide for review of administrative decisions, the courts have
occasionally found a constitutional basis for appeal or injunction
suits.51 "Judicial review," observes Professor Jaffe, "is the rule. It
rests on the congressional grant of general jurisdiction to the article
III courts. It is a basic right; it is a traditional power and the intention
'52
to exclude it must be made specifically manifest.
The issue now before us, then, is unique and difficult in two respects: first, because this is a rare instance in which Congress has in
fact made "specifically manifest" its intent that review not be available through a particular channel; and second, because the issue here
is not whether to create one channel where Congress has provided
none, but whether to recognize two where Congress has provided
one, on the ground that the one is constitutionally deficient. There
are no cases precisely on the point, and reasoning therefore must
proceed by analogy.
The Statute's Effect: The Relevance of Dombrowski v. Pfister
The analysis of this constitutional issue leads inevitably back to Dom50. Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297, 300 (1943).
51. E.g., School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94 (1902).
52. JAFFE, supra note 34, at 346.
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browsci v. Pfister,5 3 where the Supreme Court allowed a district court
injunction against enforcement of the Louisiana Subversive Activities
Law.5 4 The plaintiffs alleged they were being harassed by threatened
enforcement of the law, and that it was patently unconstitutional.
They argued that the very threats to enforce the law abridged their
freedom of expression. The evidence satisfied the Court of "the chilling effect on free expression of prosecutions initiated and threatened
in this case." 55 Voreover, the absence of any assurance that the
plaintiffs' constitutional claims could be raised in state courts made
the federal forum an essential avenue for the vindication of their constitutional interests.
Much discussion about the constitutionality of section 10(b) (3) has
assumed that Dombrowski is dispositive. In fact, it is relevant but
not controlling. The induction case is somewhat easier than Dombrowski in one sense but harder in another. It is easier because the
action is a registrant's request to the court to enjoin an administrative
decision of a federal agency (over which federal judicial control is
plenary), rather than a state criminal prosecution, as was involved in
Dombrowski.5 6 But the Selective Service case is harder in another
respect, suggested by language quoted above: The Supreme Court
was obviously troubled in Dombrowski-perhaps vitally influencedby a conviction that judicial review of the plaintiffs' constitutional
claims would be unavailable, or at least inadequate, in the state
courts. Noting that prosecution had been threatened under sections
of the Subversive Activities Law other than those on which indictments had already been brought, Mr. Justice Brennan observed for
the Court:
Since there is no immediate prospect of a final adjudication as to those
other sections-if, indeed, there is any certainty that prosecution of the
pending indictments will resolve all constitutional issues presented-a
will not provide satisfactory resoluseries of state criminal prosecutions
57
tion of constitutional issues.

At first glance the position of the draft registrant appears
materially better than that of the Louisiana civil rights lawyer, for
the Selective Service law guarantees eventual review, and the review
is in the federal courts. But below the surface there are disturbing
parallels between Dombrowski and the draft cases: First, the scope
of review of draft classifications (by decision prior to the 1967 amendment, and now by statute) is much narrower than in most administrative proceedings-even those where the liberty of the respondent
53. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
54. LA. REV. STAT. §§ 14:358-74 (Cum. Supp. 1962).

55. 380 U.S. at 487.
56. See 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964); Note, Federal Power to Enjoin State Court

Proceedings,74 HARV. L. REV. 726 (1961).

57. 380 U.S. at 489.

is not at stake. 58 Although some aspects of the classification process
can be reopened under the "no basis in fact" standard, others are
permanently insulated. While there is a good deal of case law following Estep which defines that phrase,5 9 it is unclear whether the new
statute has carried over the amplification of the test or only the phrase
itself.6 0 Thus the extent to which a registrant may reopen a classification may, in practice, depend upon the particular court to which
he goes-a matter over which he has little if any choice.
Second, access to judicial review is really no better guaranteed to
the Selective Service registrant than it was to the plaintiffs in Dombrowski. Not every registrant who is reclassified will, of course, be
called for induction. Nor does he have any control over the timing of
the call. Even more serious is the lack of certainty that a failure to
appear or a refusal of induction will result in prosecution. The legislative hearings are replete with complaints by Selective Service officials themselves about draft cases that the Justice Department
would not prosecute.6 ' General Hershey told the Senate committee
that "we are caught many times with the U.S. Attorney not agreeing
with the classification which was given by the local board" and
accordingly refusing to prosecute, even after prodding from Selective
62
Service.
This is not to say, of course, that the Justice Department should
press a case in which the draft board has manifestly erred, but it does
suggest the anomaly caused by the mounting tension between these
two branches of the Government: If the classification is clearly or
probably valid, the registrant can be fairly sure of a court test by refusing induction. But if the draft board has clearly exceeded its
constitutional or statutory power and has not been reversed by Selective Service appeal, then the registrant may have to face the continuing uncertainty created by the U.S. Attorney's inaction after he
violates the law.6 3 His case for injunctive relief is not helped by the
limbo in which such inaction places him, and there is no way he can
compel the Justice Department to close the case it declines to press.
If he is near age 26, he may be fairly safe, although even immunity
from the draft may be of little comfort if the statute of limitations on
58. For general discussion of the scope of review of administrative decisions,
see JAFFE, supra note 34, at 546-618.
59. E.g., Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375 (1955); Dickinson v. United

States, 346 U.S. 389 (1954).

60. The one court that has squarely considered this issue concluded, quite

plausibly, that Congress meant through § 10 (b) (3) to codify the case law that
had developed since Estep. United States v. Lybrand, 279 F. Supp. 74, 77
(E.D.N.Y. 1967).
61. Hearings on Extension of the Universal Military Training and Service
Act Before the House Comm. on Armed Services, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2520-26
(1967).
62. Hearings on S. 1432 Before the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 620 (1967).

63. The 1967 amendments may have narrowed the range of uncertainty a bit.

Section 12(c), 50 U.S.C. APP. § 462(c)

(Supp. III, 1965-67), requires the

JusLice Department to report to Congress when it declines to prosecute such a
case after a request from Selective Service. But the reporting requirement
is, of course, no guarantee that the case will be resolved either way.
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the criminal violation is still running.
A third important ingredient of the analogy is the most obvious and
most serious-the extraordinarily high price the registrant must pay
to obtain judicial review. Even if refusal to report or to step forward
were certain to bring about a test of the classification, the present
law imposes a harsh choice. It is frequently true that one may
have to violate a law in order to find out whether it covers him.
The consequences of a bad guess are, however, usually less drastic
than they are under the Selective Service Act, which makes a violation a felony, and for which increasingly heavy penalties are being
imposed. 64 As the Government's brief in Oestereich concedes, the
registrant "does not have an opportunity to find out in advance
whether he is wrong, and to decide then whether to take the penalty or
to accept the legal conclusion as to his status. He must take the risk in
order to find out whether he is subject to a penalty." 5
The choice may seem less cruel if one accepts the Solicitor General's view of the registrant's options: "The only effect of Section
10 (b) (3) .

.

. is to require the registrant to choose between the risk of

imprisonment and the risk of a short period of military service before
judicial review can be obtained; a pre-induction suit would permit
him to defer this choice until the review proceedings had been
completed." 66 If nothing more than time for reflection and decision
could be gained by early review of a doubtful classification, then the
interest at stake on the registrant's side would appear slight. The
Solicitor General would then be correct in questioning whether "the
Constitution requires that he be given that opportunity." But the
practical interest of the registrant in gaining a court test of his
classification before being ordered to report for induction is really
far more substantial.
A registrant may in fact be able to change his status so as to defer
the military obligation or avoid it altogether if a court sustains the
challenged classification. There is, of course, the extreme option of
renouncing one's citizenship permanently or fleeing the country
temporarily. More plausible are the choices that the law clearly
permits: One who is denied a conscientious objector exemption may
enroll in divinity school. A registrant who loses a deferment as a
college instructor may take a relatively high priority teaching position
in an inner-city school. Or he may even enlist for European duty in
one branch of the service to avoid an almost certain assignment to
64. N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1963, at 76, cols. 3-6, reports that average sentences
for refusing induction have risen from 21 months in 1965, to 26.4 months in
1966, to 32.1 months in 1967.
65. Brief for Respondents at 61, Oestereich v. Selective Service Local Bd.
No. 11, No. 46 (U.S. 1968).
66. Id. at 25.

Vietnam that would follow induction into another branch. Probably
the-registrant who appeals unsuccessfully through the administrative
channels would be well advised to seek some such alternative anyway.
But the value of a judicial determination far exceeds the worth of an
answer from the upper echelons of the very agency that imposed the
challenged classification initially. For the average registrant, judicial
review clearly is most meaningful at the pre-induction stage, and for
some, review at any other time may be virtually meaningless.
Apart from the wide range of options that may be lost by postponement of judicial review, the registrant's position may be jeopardized in a quite different way. Consider Oestereich, the case in
which a draft exemption has been revoked for anti-war protest.
When Oestereich sought to challenge his classification before induction, he was told he was raising the issue prematurely. Yet if he were
to report for induction, he might be held to have waived the very
exemption he asks to have restored. 67 Even the Government's brief
recognizes that an exemption might be held to have been waived by
accepting induction in order to raise the issue by way of habeas corpus. It is unclear whether merely reporting and then refusing induction could constitute waiver. Nevertheless, the severity of the
dilemma is clear, and further undermines the effectivness of review
that is long postponed.
-The analogy to Dombrowski is particularly strong in cases where
(as in Wolff and Oestereich) reclassification results from an act of
protest or political expression. A number of registrants sent letters
to their local boards expressing complicity with Dr. Benjamin Spock
and his co-defendants after their indictment for counseling draft
evasion late in 1967. Several of these letters triggered notices of reclassification for "counselling evasion of the Selective Service Law. '68
If it is generally known that such reclassification may follow an act
of pure speech in protest against the Vietnam War or a draft board sitin, then free expression and political activity are chilled in much the
same way as they were jeopardized in Dombrowski by threatened
enforcement of the Louisiana Subversive Activities Law. While a
constitutional lawyer may know that such activities are protected by
the first amendment and would never support a reclassification, the
average registrant is presumably less sophisticated. And where the
status of the activity is less clear-for example, peaceful picketing that
discourages volunteers from enlisting-even the lawyer may be uncertain what to expect from a district court. The temper of the times
67. See Petersen v. Clark, 285 F. Supp. 700, 712 (N.D. Cal. 1968) ("[S]ubmitting to induction is the equivalent of compliance with the administrative
order alleged to be invalid").
68. There are at least four such cases acknowledged by the Solicitor General in his Oestereich brief, supra note 63, at 44 n.18. Three of the cases are
reported to have been reversed administratively. The fourth case involved a
graduate student at the State University of New York at Buffalo, holder of a
III-A classification because of his family status, who received a I-A delinquenacy notice for "counseling evasion of the Selective Service Law"-an obvious reference to his letter of complicity sent to the draft board after the
Spock indictment.
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and the strength of emotions on both sides of the Vietnam issue only
heighten the dilemma.
There is an additional factor, unique to the draft context, that gives
special force to the Dombrowski analysis. The Justice Department
and the Selective Service System are at complete odds on the validity
of using reclassification to punish registrants for protest activities.
General Hershey took the position at the time of the Ann Arbor sit-in
that a registrant who violated any provision of the Selective Service
law should be reclassified, and probably as a delinquent (making him
immediately liable for induction). The Justice Department promptly
disagreed. An Assistant Attorney General argued publicly that reclassification should not be used "to stifle constitutionally protected
expression of views."69

When the issue was revived in the fall of 1967, the conflict between
the agencies was even sharper. Although a paper entente between
Attorney General Clark and General Hershey appeared to patch the
rift momentarily,7 0 the feud was soon back in the open. From the
White House, a lawyer-presidential assistant assured the presidents of
the Ivy League colleges that "the draft is not to be used as a punishment and ... draft boards are not to become extra-legal judges of the
legality of acts of protest. '71 But the assurance came too late. General Hershey meanwhile had told the Attorney General, "You go your
way, and I'll go mine.' 7 2 He continued to insist that registrants who
interfered with recruiting or induction were subject to reclassification
their acts of protest affected their
as delinquents, whether or not
73
individual status as registrants.
The continuing detente between General Hershey and the Justice
Department is bound to discourage many protest activities of already
wary registrants. Their position is, as Professor Thomas I. Emerson
noted recently, "a precarious one [since General Hershey] has not
withdrawn from his position, and while his view is not binding on
local draft boards, it is obviously persuasive if not compelling." 74
Realistically, that view of the memorandum is unavoidable. Yet when
the National Student Association sued to enjoin the Hershey directive,
they were told that it "had no legal effect whatever," but was
69. Letter from Assistant Attorney General Fred M. Vinson, Jr. to Prof.
Herman Schwartz, Jan. 6, 1966.
70. Joint Statement of Attorney General Ramsey Clark and Director of
Selective Service Lewis B. Hershey, Dec. 9, 1967. N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1967, at
1, col. 4; at 13, col. 1.

71. Letter from Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Special Assistant to the President,

to Kingman Brewster, Jr., president of Yale University, Dec. 26, 1967. The
letter added, "General Hershey has informed me that he adheres to these
views."
72. Philadelphia Bulletin, Dec. 12, 1967, at 2, col. 1.
73. N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1967, at 10, col. 3.

74. Emerson, Freedom of Expression in Wartime, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 975,

1009

(1968).

"merely [the general's] personal opinion" which the court had no
jurisdiction to set aside.7 5 Almost gratuitously, the court added that
"there is an adequate remedy for anyone whose rights are abused in
the event they are reclassified by exercising a constitutional right
administratively and through the Federal Courts to protect that
interest. '76 The deliberate insulation of the obviously influential
Hershey directive thus strengthens the analogy to Dombrowski.
The ConstitutionalArguments
As the Justice Department's opposition to it suggests, there are grave
doubts, both statutory and constitutional, about using reclassification
for punitive purposes. The statutory objection is rather simply stated.
In the words of White House assistant Joseph Califano: "[T]he Selective Service system is not an instrument to repress and punish
unpopular views. Nor does it vest in draft boards the judicial role
of determining the legality of individual conduct . . . . Where violations occur, the judicial system must be invoked." Professor John
Griffiths, after reviewing the statute carefully, concluded, "there is
not a single word in the Act which so much as suggests the local
boards are to act as courts, imposing induction as a summary pun77
ishment for the breach of duties under selective service law."
The constitutional argument is much more elaborate, and cannot be
fully developed here. By any of three routes it reaches the conclusion
that an administrative proceeding which leads to reclassification and
induction is so clearly deficient in procedural safeguards that it cannot support the grave consequence that follows. One route examines
the outcome of the proceeding, and characterizes it as penal in substance even though civil in form. By analogy to the Supreme Court
decision in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez78 (involving loss of nationality), there seems little doubt that reclassification and induction do
constitute a penalty, and must therefore be accompanied by various
procedural safeguards that are in fact absent from draft board proceedings.7 9 Draft boards may actually be less scrupulous of the
rights of registrants than are many federal regulatory agencies toward
75. National Student Ass'n v. Hershey, Civil No. 3078-67 (D.D.C. Mar. 8,

1968), summarized in 1 SSLR 3026 (1968).

76. Id.
77. Griffiths, supra note 38, at 4009.
78. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
79. Selective Service regulations forbid, for example, representation of a
registrant by counsel-a restriction almost unique in administrative procedure.
This provision has been sustained against constitutional challenge, United
States v. Sturgis, 342 F.2d 328 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965), on
the ground that draft board proceedings are "non-judicial in nature and
clearly non-criminal." Courts have begun to question the propriety of summary draft board proceedings, however. Recently a federal district judge in
Boston set aside a prosecution against a registrant whose draft board had not
allowed him to be present at the meeting at which his case was considered.
N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1967, at 7, cols. 1-6. Draft board proceedings may be
deficient in numerous other respects as well-failure to provide for confrontation and cross-examination, and to protect against self-incrimination; misallocation of the burden of proof, etc. See generally Griffiths, supra note 38,
at 4005-07.
CA
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the interests of businesses they regulate.
The same result follows as clearly by an alternative route. Where
reclassification is used to punish protest-that is, to judge the legality
of certain forms of expression-the draft board performs a function
as sensitive and delicate as that of a censorship board. The Supreme
Court has repeatedly withheld from administrative agencies the
power to preclude the showing of a movie or to halt the sale of books
and magazines without the most scrupulous observance of procedural
safeguards-including assumption of the burden of proof by the censor and a guarantee of very prompt judicial review.8 0 The procedural requisites would seem at least as strict where a registrant may
lose his deferment or exemption because of activity arguably protected by the first amendment. Moreover, since all the acts for which
punitive reclassification has been imposed are also violations of the
Selective Service Act, and therefore punishable criminally, the Government has an obligation to use the judicial rather than the administrative machinery. Only a court affords the guarantees that are constitutionally prerequisite to deprivation of liberty.
The first approach requires a showing that reclassification and induction constitute a "penal" sanction. The second approach depends
upon some infringement of first amendment rights. A third approach
has much broader implications. The Government brief in Oestereich
stresses that "service in the Armed Forces has traditionally been
considered a privilege . . .and not a criminal punishment."8 ' Thus,
the argument runs, a reclassification is merely the withdrawal of a
benefit and not the imposition of a penalty. For one who enjoys an
exemption, the benefit might be permanent; one who is merely deferred benefits only temporarily. Since the procedural safeguards
lacking in draft board proceedings are required only when a burden
or penalty is imposed, and not when a benefit is taken away, no attack
can be mounted on due process grounds against punitive reclassification.
An argument along these lines would have had considerable force
not too many years ago. Recently, however, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions has been refined to a point that so crude a
distinction between "penalties" and "benefits" simply will not stand.
It is true that not every withdrawal of a benefit or privilege need be
accompanied by the full panoply of procedural safeguards; no one
would argue, for instance, that a jury has to decide whether a postal
employee's Christmas bonus can be withheld for an infraction of
80. Freedman v. Marylanc, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); cf. Bantam Books, Inc. v.
Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
81. Brief for Respondents at 49-50, Oestereich v. Selective Service Local Bd.
No. 11, No. 46 (U.S. 1968).

agency rules. But where the benefit is substantial-and it is hard to
think of one that is more substantial today than a draft deferment or
exemption-a summary or truncated proceeding cannot be justifiedsimply by calling that benefit a "privilege" rather than a "right."
In the case most closely on point,8 2 the Supreme Court held that
South Carolina could not deny unemployment compensation to a
woman simply because her religion made her unavailable for Saturday employment. To condition eligibility for benefits on her willingness to compromise her religious scruples and work on the Sabbath
would violate her first amendment religious liberty. The Court
stressed the irrelevance of characterizing the South Carolina benefits
as "privilege" rather than "right," although recognizing that the state
had no constitutional duty to provide such payments to any citizen.83
So long as the state did undertake such a program, the Court warned,
it could no more curtail first amendment rights by denying or con8 4
ditioning benefits under it than by imposing direct sanctions.
A similar argument applies to punitive reclassification. A draft
deferment or exempton may be only a benefit or privilege, and hot a
right. Equally, the withdrawal of a deferment or exemption may
not be a "penalty" in the classic sense (although we have argued
above that it should be so treated). But these characterizations are
no longer dispositive of constitutional claims. Rights of free expression cannot be penalized by withdrawing so important a benefit where
imposition of a direct penalty would be unconstitutional. Even
though a full criminal trial may not be appropriate, scrutiny of the
procedures used to withdraw or curtail the enjoyment of such-a
benefit is surely warranted. The importance to the registrant of the
deferment or exemption, combined with the direct impact of punitive
reclassification, make the procedures typically used by local draft
boards highly suspect.
The combined effect of these arguments is to cast grave doubt upon
the constitutionality of section 10(b) (3). Nevertheless, only a very
persuasive case against the statute will warrant setting it aside on
constitutional grounds. Whatever may be the infirmities of an act of
Congress stripping the district courts of all jurisdiction of a particular
question or insulating particular agency decisions from all judicial
review, the case is quite different when the statute merely postpones
review until the case has "ripened" to a point deemed appropriate
for judicial intervention.
85
Postscript

The Supreme Court has now addressed itself to many of these questions. The decision of two companion cases-one by full opinion after
82. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
83. Id. at 404-05.
84. Id. at 406.
85. The major portion of this article was prepared and set in type before
(though in anticipation of) the Supreme Court decisions in the Oestereich and
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briefing and argument, the other summarily on the papers-has given
some guidance in the resolution of the quandaries of reclassification
and review. But the Court's action has raised some new doubts, and
upset some expectations, in the process of deciding the issues immediately before it. This addendum seeks to fit these two cases into the
context of the foregoing discussion.
The principal case was Oestereich,s8 the case of the divinity student who brought suit for reinstatement of his IV-D exemption that
was withdrawn because he turned in his draft card. Speaking
through Mr. Justice Douglas, the Court accepted the Solicitor General's invitation to resolve the statutory conflict in the registrant's
favor, but upon a quite narrow ground. Although section 10(b) (3)
purported to cut off all pre-induction review, at least one exception
must be recognized for the remedy of habeas corpus that could not
be legislatively extinguished. A similar exception could be implied
in favor of a divinity student, in part because the basis of the IV-D
exemption was so "plain and unequivocal" in the statute and was "in
no way contested here," and in part because the Court had serious
doubts about the proprietory of the delinquency reclassification
procedure the draft board had employed to cancel Oestereich's exemption. Mr. Justice Harlan concurred, 7 adding in a separate opinion his conviction that such an exception was not inconsistent with
the rationale of Congress in enacting the preclusive provisions of
section 10 (b) (3).
Mr. Justice Stewart was joined in dissent by Justices Brennan and
White.88 In their view, the majority had overriden on rather flimsy
grounds an unambiguous exception to district court jurisdiction-an
exception that was within the power of Congress to create, absent
any constitutional restriction not cited by the majority. To the dissenters-the legislative history and the policies behind the 1967 amendment left no doubt that Congress meant to foreclose precisely the
kind of case that had brought the issue before the Court. That the
statute might survive "unimpaired" in other contexts, as Justice Douglas has suggested, was a gratuitous observation to the dissenters in
view of the vital blow they felt Oestereich had dealt to the legislative scheme.
The companion case involved a registrant who had been denied a
conscientious objector exemption by his local board and had brought
Gabriel cases. Since revisions in the main text have not been possible at this
late date, comment upon the effect of these two decisions has been relegated
to this postscript. The substance of the foregoing discussion does not, however, appear to have been materially altered by this intervening development.
86. Oestereich v. Selective Service Local Bd. No. 11, 37 U.S.L.W. 4053
(U.S. Dec. 16, 1968).
87. Id. at 4055.
88. Id. at 4057.

suit to enjoin his induction after being classified I-A. The district
court had granted a preliminary injunction pending a review of the
merits, and the Government appealed directly to the Supreme Court.
Distinguishing Oestereich in a brief per curiam opinion, Clark v. Gabriel 9 found-in the statute a clear mandate that draft board decisions
on CO claims could be reviewed only through the channels prescribed
by section 10(b) (3). No constitutional rights of the registrant would
be infringed by postponing judicial review until after induction. 0
Moreover, the very statute that provided for exemption on grounds of
conscience conditioned that exemption upon the claim being "sustained by the local board."91 Finally, looking to the policies of section 10 (b) (3), pre-induction review would "permit precisely the kind
of 'litigious interruptions of procedures to provide necessary military
manpower' . . . which Congress sought to prevent . . .- 92 by enacting this preclusive amendment.
These two cases, taken together, do resolve some easy residual questions that are close to one end of the spectrum or the other. Clearly
covered by Gabriel, for example, are claims to exemptions or deferments that require a factual determination by the draft board of the
particular registrant's status-at least where the controversy relates
to eligibility for the dispensationn itself. The classic illustrationwhich few would have thought reviewable even before Gabrielwould be a contest over physical fitness and the board's denial of a
IV-F.9 3 There are other bases for deferral of or excuse from military
service that involve at least as close and individualized a factual determination as the CO claim in Gabriel. In these cases, there can be
little doubt that Congress meant what it appeared to say in section
10 (b) (3), and that nothing in the Constitution or in other legislation
prevents the courts from giving force to that intent.
At the other end of the scale, cases of several types seem with
equal clarity to be appropriate for pre-induction review under Oestereich. Where a deferment or exemption is given in specific and explicit terms by the Selective Service Act, but is withdrawn by a draft
board for conduct unrelated to the basis for the dispensation, there
seems little doubt that the courts may intervene before induction. If,
for example, a reserve officer, or a 45 year old man, or a sole surviving son, is reclassified I-A and called up for service, the district
89. 37 U.S.L.W. 3217 (U.S. Dec. 16, 1968).

90. The Court assumed, at least, that no constitutional issues were implicated by the procedure for denying a conscientious objector claim. That
assumption is consistent with the Court's earlier decision in United States v.
Seeger, 380 U.S. 165 (1965), which avoided the constitutional issue lurking
behind the statutory exemption for conscientious objectors by construing the
statute broadly enough to include the claims before it. Curiously, no mention
was made of Seeger in Gabriel. Perhaps this is because of the rather implausible nature of the particular exemption claim, as revealed in the summary of the disputed testimony set forth in an appendix to the concurring
opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas.
91. 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (Supp. MI, 1965-67).

92. 37 U.S.L.W. at 3217.
93. Cf. Costas Elena v. President of the United States, 288 F. Supp. 388
(D.P.R. 1968).
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courts would seem empowered to enjoin the reclassification. Despite
the language of section 10 (b) (3), neither its policies nor the Supreme
Court's view of its reach closes district court doors to such registrants
as these.
Clearly there is much ground between these poles. Most of the
sensitive and difficult cases bred by the Vietnam War lie in the zone
left gray by these recent decisions. Several cases which may soon
come before the Court on certiorari or appeal invite the refinement of
the Oestereich-Gabriel doctrine.9 4 The volume of litigation in the
lower courts within the past year that turns upon questions not resolved by the Court attests to the continuing importance of this area
of inquiry. District courts must glean whatever help they can from
Oestereich and Gabriel but continue to interpret and apply section
10 (b) (3) to a myriad of new and infinitely varied problems.
Several prototype cases will suggest the range of unresolved issues. Case A involves a registrant who held a I-S deferment during
his first two years as a college undergraduate. During the third
year he receives a traveling fellowship from a national foundation,
and spends the year doing field research throughout the United
States. The local board decides he is no longer eligible for his deferment, and reclassifies him I-A. He sues to enjoin his induction and
get back his deferment. Case B also involves a full-time undergraduate student. He turns in his draft card to his local board and soon
receives a I-A notice, having been declared delinquent because of his
nonpossession of the registration certificate. Case C involves a third
college student who is reclassified I-A delinquent because of his participation in a campus demonstration against a military recruiter,
contrary to General Hershey's directive of November 1967. Finally,
Case D is that of a college student, deferred in II-S, who receives a
I-A delinquency notice because he urged other persons to turn in
their draft cards but has not done so himself. (Although much
broader range might have been achieved in the ensuing discussion
by changing the basis of the deferment, it seemed wiser to hold at
least one ingredient constant. Of all the variables, the basis of the
exemption or deferment seems the one most readily resolved by reference to Gabrieland Oestereich.)
Case A (that of the student who is reclassified because the board
decides he is no longer a full-time undergraduate) seems fairly close
to Gabriel. Although the granting or withholding of a student deferment does not usually involve the exercise of the local board's
discretion, this case shows that factual determinations of individual
claims may sometimes be required. When the contest is over the
94. See, e.g., Faulkner v. Clifford, 289 F. Supp. 895 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).

facts of the particular case, and when the disputed inferences about
the facts relate centrally to the basis for the deferment or exemption,
pre-induction review seems unavailable-however harsh and inequitable that result may be to the registrant who changed his status in
good faith or innocence. Unless it be said that pre-induction review
is always required, regardless of the basis for the exemption or deferment, there seems to be no constitutional obstacle here. For even the
strictest application of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions does
not demand judicial review before withdrawal of a benefit which the
Government was not constitutionally compelled to confer.
Case B moves much closer to the center of the scale. The basis for
the dispensation-student status-is the same here as in Case A.
There is no constitutional right to be relieved of military service
while or because one attends college; Congress could remove the student deferment from the statute tomorrow. But there the analogy
stops. Several important factors suggest that this case is really
much closer to Oestereich than to Gabriel, and that pre-induction review should be allowed.
First, and perhaps most important, the conduct that triggered the
reclassification was unrelated to the basis for the deferment. One
who surrenders his draft card in protest against the war is still a
student. Thus, as in Oestereich, the factual basis for the deferment "is . . . in no way contested here." 95 Second, whatever factual
determination must be made-and there is not likely to be any contest
over whether the registrant sent back his card, on what day and to
what agency, etc.-can be undertaken as easily by the court as by the
draft board. 96 There is no special expertise involved that would
warrant a finding of delegation of exclusive pre-induction review to
the Selective Service channels. Third, and closely related, reviewing the reclassification is not likely to impede significantly the mobilization of needed military manpower. The number of affected
cases will be quite small. Once the basic questions are resolved,
other cases will fall readily into line. Thus the policies behind section 10(b) (3) are not frustrated or jeopardized by allowing pre-induction court review in such a case.
Two other facets of Case B require further discussion, and bear
significantly on Cases C and D. Clearly the case for judicial review
prior to induction or prosecution is far stronger where the registrant's
constitutional liberties are directly affected. Reliance upon Dombrowski v. Pfister 97-curiously uncited in any of the several opinions
95. 37 U.S.L.W. at 4054.
96. In his concurring opinion in Oestereich Mr. Justice Harlan reached
essentially this conclusion by a different route. The preclusive operation of
§ 10 (b) (3) was limited to "classification or processing of any registrant by
local boards." This phrase, he suggested, applied to "the numerous discretionary, factual, and mixed law-fact determinations which a Selective Service
Board must make prior to issuing an order to report for induction." On the
other hand, the key phrase dic, not "prohibit review of a claim, such as that
made here. . . , that the very statutes or regulations which the board administers are facially invalid." 37 U.S.L.W. at 4055.
97. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
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in Oestereich or Gabriel-supports such a suit where first amendment liberties are jeopardized by administrative action. Arguably,
however, this case presents no substantial first amendment claim because of the Supreme Court's decision last spring in United States
v. O'Brien.98 That case involved a prosecution of a registrant for
nonpossession and destruction of a registration certificate he had
burned in protest against the Vietnam War. A majority of the
Court concluded that the Government's interest in requiring a registrant to have his card intact at all times outweighed whatever first
amendment claim he may have had to employ this particular form
of political expression. On the basis of O'Brien, the dissenters in
Oestereich argued that "no bona fide First Amendment issue" was
presented; a registrant's "alleged return of his registration certificate
to the Government would not be protected expression." 99
The constitutional underpinning of Case B is not so clearly removed by O'Brien, however. That case decided only the constitutional issues presented by the ban against destruction of draft cards;
affirmance on that ground made it unnecessary, the Court noted explicitly, to consider the validity of the nonpossession count. Moreover, the contexts are different. O'Brien involved direct prosecution
for an offense against the Selective Service System. Case B, by contrast, involves an indirect form of punishment-the withdrawal of a
benefit of considerable value to the recipient. And the grounds for
the withdrawal, however material they may be to the administration
of the Selective Service, are quite unrelated to the basis for the
deferment. The Government's interest in prosecuting the registrant
for burning (or not carrying) his card may be quite substantial when
weighed against the registrant's interest in protesting through a
particular medium. Particularly so long as the direct sanction is
available, the Government's interest in taking away a student deferment when no change in the registrant's student status has occurred
seems far less clear. The applicability of O'Brien to the constitutional issues raised by Case B thus seems doubtful on two distinct
grounds.
There is one other facet to the case that merits discussion. The
mechanism by which the student deferment is withdrawn for conduct unrelated to the basis for the deferment is, of course, the delinquency reclassification device. This procedure rests upon Selective Service regulations that appear never to have been squarely
challenged in court. In his opinion for the Court in Oestereich, however, Mr. Justice Douglas cast a very long shadow over this mechanism without going quite so far as to declare it unconstitutional.
98. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).

99. 37 U.S.L.W. at 4058 n.11.

Weighing importantly in favor of pre-induction review was the absence of any legislative standards governing the delinquency reclassification procedure. The Court concluded that the "scope of the
statutory delinquency concept is not broad enough to sustain a revocation of what Congress has granted as a statutory right, or sufficiently buttressed by legislative standards ....
u00 Even where
the statutory basis of the exemption or deferment is less explicit the
same reasoning should apply. In short, the Oestereich decision leaves
very grave doubt about the constitutionality of delinquency reclassifications-for reasons that are basic to administrative law and delegation of legislative power. Particularly where first amendment
rights are at stake, the scope of delegation should be jealously reviewed and circumscribed by the courts if Congress has not provided the requisite standards. 101
In his concurrence Justice Harlan made the same point in a slightly
different way. Oestereich, he suggested, was really a challenge to the
very procedure-the statutory framework-under which the draft
board had withdrawn the deferment. Since that was the central
issue, rather than a factual inquiry into an individual's status (such
as Gabriel involved), the competence of the courts was clear and
that of the boards doubtful. "Adjudication of the constitutionality
of congressional enactments," observed Justice Harlan, "has generally been thought beyond the jurisdiction of administrative agencies."'1 2 Indeed, he added, the absence of procedural safeguards in
draft board proceedings-such as the almost unique denial of counsel
-has been sustained "on the ground that the proceedings are nonjudicial."103
The force of this last argument will depend, of course, on the registrant's aiming his suit at the delinquency procedure and the legislative authority invoked by the Selective Service. But after the broad
hint given in Oestereich, what draft lawyer will not, in such a case,
mount a major constitutional attack upon the delinquency reclassification device as well as upon the particular classification? And if
the majority opinion is broadly construed, the Court has already all
but held the delinquency procedure unconstitutional, deferring for
the coup de grace to the district court to which the case was remanded.
If so strong a case can be made for review of Case B, then Cases C
and D would appear a fortiori reviewable. The catalytic conduct of
the registrant in each case is wholly unrelated to the basis for his
deferment. As in Case B, the Government has a direct sanctioncriminal prosecution-by which to vindicate whatever interest it may
have in punishing or deterring that conduct. (In Case C, the conduct
may be punishable, although only a criminal trial-with the full
range of attendant safeguards that are denied in a draft board hearing--could make that determination. It seems unlikely that the con100. Id. at 4055.
101. See Griffiths, supra note 38, at 4005-07.
102. 37 U.S.L.W. at 4056 (footnote omitted).

103. Id.
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duct in Case D-counseling others to violate the draft law-wouh
be punishable at all if a substantial first amendment defense wa;
made.) In Cases C and D, as in B, there is no contest about th
basis for the exemption as such; the student is still a student, what
ever else he may have done. And in all three cases the particula
conduct works a forfeiture of the student deferment only by resor
to the now dubious delinquency reclassification procedure. Finally
it seems unlikely that keeping the doors of the district courts opel
to such cases would seriously disrupt or impede the mustering o
troops essential to the national interest. There is, in short, no logica
basis for treating any of these cases (B, C and D) differently fron
Oestereich itself.
This analysis suggests the Oestereich dissenters were right in thei
assessment of the reach of the decision. Whatever the majority mai
have said about preserving "unimpaired" the "normal operations" o:
section 10(b) (3), the exception has gone far toward swallowing uj
the rule. There may still be a few difficult cases, and many run-of
the-mill suits, which (like Gabriel) involve factual determinations tha
are (a) clearly within the draft board's competence; and (b) centra
to the exemption or deferment that is being contested. But the bull
of the Vietnam War cases seem to fall on the other side of the line
within the logic of Oestereich if not its words. These cases are ap
propriate for review because they include all or most of the critica
factors found in the hypothetical cases B, C and D analyzed above
Whatever may have been the design of Congress in enacting sectior
10(b) (3), the Court has avoided or postponed the difficult constitu
tional issues by according that statute a somewhat narrower reac
than its language might warrant.
There is a particular irony to what has happened since 1965. W(
began with the Wolff case, involving the Michigan students reclassi
fied because they took part in a draft board sit-in. This was the case
that Congress presumably meant to overrule by enacting section 1(
(b) (3). Yet this now seems among the clearest of the cases in whici
pre-induction review is preserved by Oestereich, unless that decisior
is confined almost literally to its own facts. It is clear that Congres!
has not succeeded in doing what it presumably set out to do b3
amending the Selective Service Act. Any attempt to plug the gal
would undoubtedly revive the constitutional issue that, for the mo
ment, has been neatly circumvented.

